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ABSTRACT
The largest 20th-century increase in U.S. home ownership occurred between 1940 and 1960, associated
largely with declining age at first ownership.  I shed light on the contribution of coincident government
mortgage market interventions by examining home loan benefits granted under the World War II and
Korean War GI Bills.  The impact of veterans' housing benefits on home ownership is positive for
young men, and declines with age.  Veterans' benefits increased aggregate home ownership rates primarily
by shifting purchase earlier in life, explaining 7.4 percent of the overall 1940-60 increase and 25 percent
of the increase for affected cohorts.  A rough extrapolation suggests that broader changes in mortgage








The primary focus of federal housing policy over the last eighty years has been intervention in
mortgage markets. In part, the goal of these policies has been to extend home ownership to
marginal home buyers, and many observers have argued that the mortgage policies born of the
Great Depression and World War II are responsible for the dramatic transformation in United
States housing markets and home ownership in the mid-20th century.1 But surprisingly, neither
the eect of these policies on historical rates of home ownership, nor the set of factors driving
changes in housing markets during and after World War II, is well understood. The recent crisis and
debate over the government's role in housing nance makes evidence on these questions particularly
timely.2
Of the interventions that began in the 1930's and 1940's, the mortgage insurance and guarantees
provided through the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and Veterans Administration (VA)
were among the largest in scale. The establishment of these programs coincided with the most
striking changes in home ownership in the last century. Between 1940 and 1960, the rate of home
ownership increased sharply from 44 to 62 percent, as younger individuals became home owners at
unprecedented rates. The prole of home ownership by age was nearly linear up to age 60 in every
Census year from 1900 to 1940, but by 1960 had taken the concave shape that persists today.3
This paper sheds light on the role of these mortgage market interventions { and by extension,
on the role of changes in mortgage terms more broadly { by providing estimates of the contribution
of the VA home loan program to increased rates of home ownership. Past work, such as Jackson
(1985), Green and Wachter (2005), and Vigdor (2006), has discussed the potential role of the FHA
1Examples are Jackson (1985) and Schwartz (2010).
2The specic type of intervention discussed here { mortgage insurance and guarantees { remains central to housing
policy. For example, at the end of Fiscal Year 2011, the amount of outstanding principal guaranteed by the Federal
Housing Administration was $1.097 trillion (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2011). Policies
meant to encourage home ownership are often based on the argument that it has social benets; Haurin, Dietz and
Weinberg (2003) provide a review of the academic literature on this issue. I do not take up this question here, but the
potential for such spillovers is one motivation for examining whether, and how, these programs aect home ownership.
3Figure 2 depicts the changing age structure of ownership in the United States over the 20th century. Explaining
the change in the age prole of ownership has not been the direct focus of earlier research, but Aaron (1972) discusses
the particularly large increases in home ownership for younger age groups over this period, Chevan (1989) shows that
the age at which the median individual in a cohort became a home owner fell, and Collins and Margo (2001) note an
increase in the concavity of the age-ownership prole in their study of racial dierences in home ownership over the
20th century.
1and VA in explaining the observed changes in housing markets over the 20th century.4,5 However,
a number of other major changes over the same period could have driven the increase in home
ownership. The favorable tax treatment of owner-occupied housing became more important during
World War II as marginal tax rates rose (Aaron, 1972; Rosen and Rosen, 1980; Rosen, Rosen and
Holtz-Eakin, 1984). Rising real incomes and savings rates during World War II and afterwards
may have increased demand for housing (Chevan, 1989; Chambers, Garriga and Schlagenhauf,
2011); increased rates of family formation after the war may have done so as well.6 Decreased
transportation costs in the postwar era (Baum-Snow, 2007) may have increased home ownership
by lowering the cost of suburban residence.7 Finally, even if changes in housing nance played an
important role, the extent to which federal credit aids were themselves a major factor is an open
question, for which we lack rigorous quantitative estimates.
My empirical design attempts to hold these other factors constant, and, motivated by the
increased concavity of the age-home ownership prole, allows the estimated eects of terms on
home nance to vary with a person's age.8 I use the home loan benets provided to veterans
under the World War II and Korean War GI Bills as variation in the mortgage terms available
to an individual. Because of selection into military service during World War II and the Korean
War, direct comparisons of veterans to non-veterans are problematic.9 However, the smoothness
of home ownership rates in age motivates between-cohort comparisons in the spirit of a regression
discontinuity design; this variation is similar to that used in previous work on the GI Bill, such as
4An older literature focused on the eects of federal loan insurance on the supply of credit and the volume of
residential construction: examples include Break (1961), Grebler (1960), and Klaman (1961).
5A large body of work provides evidence on the impact of borrowing constraints on home purchase in more recent
periods. Examples include Linneman and Wachter (1989), Duca and Rosenthal (1994), Haurin, Hendershott and
Wachter (1997), and Linneman et al. (1997). Chiuri and Jappelli (2003) compare age-ownership proles across coun-
tries and argue that the terms of mortgage nance, and down-payments in particular, are an important determinant
of the distribution of home ownership across age groups.
6For detailed data series on savings rates, see Carter et al., eds (2006).
7This may be the case if, for example, a lower price of land more distant from city centers facilitates construction
of larger, single-family detached dwellings, and for agency reasons these tend to be owner-occupied more often than
multi-family structures (Glaeser and Shapiro, 2003).
8As discussed in Section 3, heterogeneity of eects by age is a prediction of a standard life-cycle model of tenure
choice, in which relaxing liquidity constraints may primarily serve to induce earlier home purchase.
9Note that positive selection into the military does not necessarily imply that naive comparisons of veterans to non-
veterans would yield upwardly-biased estimates. For example, positively selected individuals may make investments
that delay rst home purchase. A comparison of age-ownership proles for college and high school graduates suggests
that over this period, college graduates were less likely to own early in life, and more likely to own later in life.
2Bound and Turner (2002). The probability of military service by date of birth fell steeply with the
declines in inductions under the draft at the end of World War II and the Korean War. Comparison
between, rather than within, cohorts alleviates concerns that dierences in later life outcomes are
due to pre-existing dierences in characteristics between veterans and non-veterans.10 The presence
of two `breaks' { one associated with the end of World War II and one with the end of the Korean
War { gives estimates at two ages in each Census year. Testing for dierences at each break in each
Census from 1960 to 1980, I estimate the impact of veteran status at multiple ages and points in
time.
The results of the analysis are consistent with eects of easier housing nance that decline with
age. I nd large eects of veteran status on the probability of home ownership in 1960 at both
breaks. In 1960, men born at the World War II break were 32 years old, and about 53 percent
owned their homes. I estimate an eect of 13 percentage points for men who were induced into
military service at the break as a result of their date of birth. Men at the Korean War break were
26 years old in 1960, and about 28 percent were home owners. For these men, the analogous eect
was 18 percentage points. Consistent with eects that decline with age, the 1960 Korean War
estimate is larger than the World War II estimate in both percent and percentage point terms, and
I nd no evidence for positive eects of veteran status on home ownership at either break in 1970
or 1980, when a person born at either break would have been at least 36 years old. In other words,
mortgage subsidies appear to have increased aggregate rates of home ownership by shifting home
purchase earlier in life, rather than by shifting those who never would have purchased into home
ownership.11
The GI Bills provided several other benets as well, such as support for education, and military
service itself also may have inuenced an individual's demand for housing. I present several pieces
of evidence suggesting that the observed eects of veteran status on home ownership are not due
primarily to non-housing benets or direct impacts of military service. First, to address possible
10This research design does not address the issue that service itself may have direct impacts on later outcomes, a
potential confound I address in Section 5.
11It is also possible that benets increased the amount of housing consumed. A similar strategy applied to various
measures of housing consumption give estimates with broadly similar trends, but which tend to be imprecisely
estimated. In the paper I focus on the tenure decision; I discuss results for housing consumption in Appendix 4.
3dierences in education or income, I note that there is evidence of higher income in 1960 only
for veterans at the Korean War break, and estimates of the impact of veteran status on home
ownership change little after controlling for income and education directly. Second, the housing
outcomes of World War I veterans, who received some benets but no national housing benets,
suggest that `service eects' were not the driving force behind veterans' higher rates of ownership:
World War I veterans at age 23 in 1920 and age 33 in 1930 appear no more likely to have owned
their homes than similar non-veterans. Finally, over the decade following World War II, veterans'
rates of home purchase responded signicantly to plausibly exogenous year-to-year changes in the
availability and generosity of the home loan benet.
I use the baseline estimates to calculate a counterfactual age-ownership prole in 1960, which
can be used to assess the contribution of VA home loan benets to the overall increase in home
ownership from 1940 to 1960.12 The estimates suggest that about 39 percent of the increase for
men of age 26, and about 26 percent of the increase for men of age 32, can be attributed to VA
home loan benets. I extrapolate from these age-specic estimates to calculate the share of the
overall increase that can be attributed to the VA mortgage program. I nd that the program can
explain about 7.4 percent of the overall increase in home ownership from 1940 to 1960, and about
25 percent of the increase for men of the ages aected by the program. To the extent that the VA
program increased house prices, as argued by Vigdor (2006), it is possible that this gure may be
an overestimate, reecting crowd-out of non-veterans rather than net increases in home ownership.
However, investigation of cross-state variation in the veteran share of the population turns up little
evidence that the estimates are driven by crowd-out: across a variety of controls and specications,
a greater veteran presence is, if anything, positively associated with non-veterans' rates of home
ownership. Hence, these estimates are likely to be a lower bound on the impact of the VA program.
Moreover, they also serve as a lower bound on the overall impact of changes in home nance in the
mid-century rise in home ownership: a rough calculation suggests that broader trends in mortgage
terms may explain about 40 percent of the 1940-1960 increase.
This paper provides a rigorous empirical link between the aggregate mid-century increase in
12Of course 1940 need not be the base year { the counterfactual 1960 age prole can be compared to any Census
year.
4home ownership, the transformation in the age structure of ownership, and contemporaneous
changes in mortgage terms that may have relaxed liquidity constraints. In addition to shedding
new light on the role of interventions in mortgage markets in the 1940's and 1950's, this paper
complements work on the impacts of veterans' education benets (Bound and Turner, 2002; Stan-
ley, 2003; Page, 2006) by investigating the eects of other major benets provided under the GI
Bills. A similar paper to this one is Yamashita (2008), who examines discontinuities in home own-
ership around the World War II break in 1960 and 1980 and nds similar results; Yamashita does
not examine the Korean War break, which is what allows estimation of a counterfactual 1960 age
prole here.13 In a study of population loss from central cities in the postwar period, Boustan and
Shertzer (forthcoming) investigate the impact of World War II veteran status on suburban resi-
dence (although not home ownership). As noted above, Vigdor (2006) also examines the VA home
loan program, but focuses primarily on whether it aected house prices: in doing so he provides an
estimate of the eect of VA eligibility on home ownership as of 1970, based on direct comparisons
of veterans to non-veterans. I compare his ndings to my own for 1960 below.
2 Background
2.1 Trends in housing tenure and mortgage terms over the 20th century
In the history of living arrangements in the United States over the 20th century, the period from
1940 to 1960 was distinctive in terms of the large overall increase in home ownership. Figure 1 shows
the share of occupied dwelling units that were owner-occupied, the measure of `home ownership' for
which the most complete time series data exist.14 Home ownership rose from 44 percent in 1940 to
62 percent in 1960. A fact that has gone unrecognized in much of the recent economics literature
13I became aware of Yamashita's unpublished work after completing the main analysis and a draft of this paper.
In addition to dierences in implementation and my examination of the Korean War break, I do more to rule out
direct eects of military service as a driving factor. Yamashita oers a discussion of the eects of the program by
race, which I do not examine here.
14The data from the Decennial Census are available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/
historic/owner.html. The gures for 1944, 1945, and 1947 are estimates, from supplements to the October 1944,
November 1945, and April 1947 sample surveys for the Monthly Report on the Labor Force (U.S. Bureau of the
Census, 1945, 1946, 1947). The gure for 1956 is from the National Housing Inventory (U.S. Bureau of the Census,
1958).
5is that more than half of the overall increase over these two decades took place by the end of 1945.
Since the VA home loan program gave out relatively few loans before the end of World War II,
ideally one would be able to measure the contribution of the VA to the increase in home ownership
after 1945. My empirical analysis, however, focuses on home ownership at the level of the individual
rather than that of the dwelling unit, and therefore provides an estimate of the counterfactual 1960
home ownership rate at the individual level. Since 1940 is the last year before the creation of the
VA home loan program for which microdata are available for calculating an individual-level home
ownership rate, my discussion emphasizes the change from that year.
In the following descriptive statistics and the analysis below, I restrict the sample to US-born
men 18 years old and above, and classify an individual as a home owner if he was the household
head or spouse of the head in an owner-occupied dwelling.15 By this measure, the increase in home
ownership was also most striking from 1940 to 1960, increasing from 27 to 53 percent.16
The crucial characteristic of the mid-century increase in home ownership was that it largely
represented a change in the age pattern of ownership. This is evident in Figure 2, which shows
ownership rates for men 18 and above, by age, in Censuses from 1900 to 1980.17 The age prole of
home ownership was stable in every year up to 1940, and nearly linear up to age 60, but from 1960
onwards became strikingly more concave. Home ownership rates for men in their early 30's more
than doubled, while home ownership among older age groups increased substantially less in these
two decades.18 A natural interpretation is that the increase in ownership in the 1940's and 1950's
largely represented earlier purchases among individuals who would have otherwise purchased later
in life.
15Individual-level data on home ownership come from IPUMS Census microdata (Ruggles et al., 2008). The
microdata list a single head and tenure status for each household. In addition to identifying owners in this way,
I classify an individual as a renter if he is the head or the spouse of the head in a renter-occupied unit, or is a
boarder in a dwelling owned by someone else, and as `living with relatives' if he is otherwise related to the head.
The remainder, always under 8 percent, encompasses group quarters, such as military barracks or rooming houses;
domestic employees; and other arrangements that could not be classied. Microdata from the 1950 Census of Housing
were destroyed after tabulation (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1984), so in these statistics and the analysis below no
information is given on living arrangements in 1950.
16Aggregate trends in individual-level living arrangements are shown in Appendix Figure A3.1.
17For visual clarity in interpreting the 1940-60 change, 1990 and 2000 are not shown. In these years, the age prole
was somewhat less steep but its basic concavity persisted.
18Conditioning on household head status gives, as one might expect, higher home ownership rates for both the
youngest and the oldest age groups, and a nearly linear age prole of home ownership well beyond age 60 in 1940
and earlier.
6The observed decrease in the age at rst home ownership suggests that changes in nance played
a central role in changes in housing markets between 1940 and 1960. Table 1 shows observed loan
terms on the stock of rst mortgages in 1950, 1960 and 1970, from the Census Residential Finance
Survey, and compares these terms to `typical' loan terms of the 1920's.19 It also compares VA loans
to those of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), which provided insurance on somewhat less
generous terms than VA loans, and to `conventional' loans that had no government insurance.
Down-payments fell substantially between 1920 and 1960, as reected by increases in the median
loan-to-value ratio (LTV). In 1920 a down-payment of 40 to 50 percent would have been needed,
but by 1960 the median down-payment in the stock of rst mortgages was about 20 percent. The
lower down-payments were concentrated in the government-insured market: VA-guaranteed loans
typically had the lowest down-payments, with a median of about 9 percent, followed by FHA with
a median of about 17 percent. A well-known feature of VA loans is that they were often available
with no down-payment: between one-fth and one-third of the stock of VA loans in each Census
year from 1950 to 1970 had LTV's of 100 percent or more.
Lower down-payments were accompanied by lengthening loan maturities. Maturities lengthened
in all sectors of the market. As a result, monthly payments remained more or less stable as loan-
to-value ratios increased. The median term was similar for VA and FHA loans, while conventional
loans had substantially shorter maturities. Government-insured mortgages also typically had lower
interest rates than conventional loans, due in part to interest rate ceilings on government loans:
VA interest rates, for example, were initially capped at 4 percent.
2.2 The VA home loan guaranty program
The easier terms observed for VA mortgages were associated with a home loan guarantee program
that was initially authorized under the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, better known as
the GI Bill. The main VA home loan program, under Section 501, was not a loan directly from the
19Figures for the 1920's come from Aaron (1972), and originally from the NBER's Urban Real Estate Finance
Project; Morton (1956) provides a description of the results and sample. As discussed there, the sample may not
be entirely representative of the population of loans in the 1920's, so these gures should be interpreted with some
caution. A full picture of lending in the 1920's would also require discussion of junior mortgages and the arrangements
oered by Building and Loan associations (Snowden, 2010).
7government, but rather a guarantee to lenders against losses on home loans that had been approved
by the VA, up to a specied amount.20 The guarantee eliminated much of the risk to the lender,
allowing easier terms for borrowers. Eligibility for this loan guarantee was one of several benets
extended to veterans, with the broad aim of speeding readjustment to civilian life.21 Eligibility for
the veterans' housing benet was determined by dates of service: an individual was eligible under
the 1944 GI Bill if he or she had served for at least 90 days, with some service occurring between
September 16, 1940 and the ocial termination of the war, later determined to be July 25, 1947.
The program was initially intended to last only a few years, but was later extended and re-extended
several times before becoming permanent. Subsequent GI Bills covered veterans of other periods
{ the Korean War GI Bill (passed in 1952) covered individuals who served between June 17, 1950
and January 31, 1955, and the `Cold War' GI Bill (passed in 1966) ultimately covered individuals
who began service after January 1955, although slightly less generously.22
In order to scale the eects of VA-eligibility on home ownership that I discuss below, it is useful
to clarify the size of the nancial advantage conferred by the program. My discussion emphasizes
dierences in down-payments between VA and alternative terms. Interest rates were typically
slightly lower for VA loans, which tended to attenuate the increase in monthly payments when
down-payments were reduced, holding the loan term constant. But based on the terms actually
observed for dierent loan types, VA loans may not have had the lowest monthly payments.23
Herzog and Earley (1970) provide data on terms for VA and FHA loans originated in each year
from 1946 to 1967, giving some indication as to how much eligibility would have relaxed liquidity
constraints for veterans at dierent points in time. I present some of their data in Appendix
20If a borrower became delinquent, the mortgagee would typically be expected to foreclose and convey the property
to the VA, which would compensate the lender for losses incurred. As of 1945, the guarantee was limited to 50 percent
of the outstanding loan amount at any point in the life of the loan, up to a maximum of $4,000, but the limit was
relaxed in later years.
21The following discussion of the VA home loan program follows ORC Macro (2004) and Aaron (1972).
22Active-duty servicemembers were made eligible under the Veterans' Housing Amendments Act of 1976.
23Consider, for example, purchasing a $7,500 house in 1950 under VA and FHA loan terms. (The median self-
reported value of one-unit owner-occupied structures in 1950 was $7,354. Median house values reported in this section
come from http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/historic/values.html.) Using the median terms
given in Table 1, a 20-year VA loan with a 10 percent down-payment and 4 percent interest rate, used to purchase a
$7,500 house, would have a monthly payment of about $41. The monthly payment for a 20-year FHA loan with a 20
percent down-payment and a 4.5 percent interest rate used to purchase the same house would have a lower monthly
payment, about $38. (If the VA loan had a 20 percent down-payment but other terms were the same, the monthly
payment would be a little more than $36.)
8Table A3.1. Over the 1950's, average loan-to-value ratios for VA loans typically exceeded those
for FHA loans by about 5 to 10 percentage points. For loans originated in 1960, the average
LTV for VA loans was slightly over 95 percent and that for FHA slightly under 91 percent.24 On
average, by 1960 those who borrowed under the VA program were probably riskier than FHA
borrowers,25 so the dierences in average terms are likely to understate the gap between the terms
the same individual would receive under the VA and the FHA. To a rst approximation, then, it
seems reasonable to scale the 1960 results by supposing that VA eligibility would have reduced the
required down-payment by about 10 percentage points. Between 1960 and 1970, LTV's rose for
both VA and FHA loans, but the dierence between them remained similar. By 1967, LTV's for
VA loans averaged about 97.5 percent and for FHA loans about 93 percent. Hence, in terms of
down-payment requirements, a veteran's alternative option improved over the 1960's, although not
by a great deal.26
A large share of veterans used the housing benet, and loans granted under the VA program
represented a substantial portion of the mortgage market in the postwar period. Estimates from
the 1977 National Survey of Veterans suggest that of about 17 million male veterans of World War
II and the Korean War living at the time, roughly 6.3 million had used a VA loan, and 5.5 million
had used a VA loan for their rst home (Hammond, 1980). Widespread use of the benet made
VA loans a substantial share of the overall market: over the period from 1946 through 1960, VA
loans composed about 16 percent of the total dollar volume of all nonfarm mortgage recordings of
$20,000 or less, and about 12 percent of the total number.27
Responses from the 1977 Survey of Veterans also suggest that the availability of VA loans
induced earlier home purchase, or purchase of a more expensive house, for a large segment of the
24The data in Herzog and Earley (1970) separate loans for new and existing houses; I weight these by the share
of VA and FHA loans for each type, using data from Federal Home Loan Bank Board (1961).
25In 1960, FHA borrowers had incomes 25 to 30 percent higher than the median nonfarm family income, while
VA borrowers had incomes only about 9 percent higher than the median (Herzog and Earley, 1970).
26An alternative scaling that incorporates other terms of the loan is to take the dierence in present discounted
values of loans with the average VA and average FHA terms. Doing so with the 1960 average terms (VA: 95 percent
LTV, 5.25 percent interest rate, 27-year maturity; FHA: 91 percent LTV, 5.75 percent interest rate, 27-year maturity)
for the median house { $11,900 in 1960 USD; $58,600 in 2000 USD { gives a dierence of about $2900 in 2000 USD,
using a discount rate of 4 percent.
27These gures are my calculations using data from Housing and Home Finance Agency (1961). FHA was of
comparable magnitude, making up about 13 percent of the total dollar volume between 1946 and 1960.
9veteran population.28 For veterans who reported using a VA loan for their rst home, the 1977
survey asked if they would have been able to purchase the home without the VA loan. About 61
percent of World War II and Korean War veterans who had used a VA loan for their rst home
reported that they would not have had a sucient down-payment for the house without the VA
loan; an additional 6 percent said that they would have purchased a less expensive house. About
30 percent said they could have purchased the home anyway (the remainder gave either multiple
answers or no answer).
Given their scale, the VA and FHA programs almost certainly inuenced terms in conventional
lending. Aaron (1972), for example, argues that the VA and FHA led to more liberal terms in
conventional markets by demonstrating that smaller down-payments and longer maturities would
not increase risk as much as lenders had anticipated. More concretely, the FHA in particular was
credited with standardizing the analysis of mortgage lending risk, and its creation in 1934 with the
intent of providing fully amortized, high-LTV mortgages also necessitated the modication of laws
in many states that restricted state-regulated nancial institutions from investing in mortgages
with LTV's of more than 50 or 60 percent (Semer et al., 1976). The indirect eects of the FHA
and VA were surely important, but in this paper I focus on the direct eect of the VA.
3 Conceptual framework
The theoretical literature embedding tenure choice in life-cycle models (e.g., Artle and Varaiya
(1978)) claries the impact of a reduction in down-payments on home ownership rates of dierent
age groups. This literature typically assumes that all individuals prefer to own, either because
of `pride of ownership,' or because favorable tax treatment or the elimination of agency problems
between the landlord and tenant makes owner-occupied housing less costly than equivalent rental
housing. If a down-payment is necessary to obtain nancing for the purchase of housing, young
people without sucient assets for a down-payment may depress consumption early in life in order
to have greater consumption later. Under these conditions, relaxing the down-payment constraint
can induce earlier purchase as the burden of reduced consumption in the beginning phase of the life
28The following estimates are based on the tabulations in Appendix E of Hammond (1980).
10cycle is alleviated. Broadly speaking, since young individuals with few assets are most likely to face
this constraint, they see larger increases in ownership from a relaxation of down-payments than
do older individuals, who are likely to have already accumulated assets. However, if the required
down-payment is not reduced to zero, the largest eects may not be for the youngest individuals,
who still need to save for the smaller but positive down-payment. It is also possible that under a
high down-payment regime some individuals never choose to reduce their consumption enough to
purchase a home, so that a reduction in down-payments may shift them from never owning into
owning at some point. Hence, it is not obvious theoretically that the only eect of easier nance
would be to shift purchase earlier.
Simulations such as those in Hayashi, Ito and Slemrod (1988) and Sheiner (1995) have calibrated
such models to t recent periods, and have found evidence that these constraints are quantitatively
important.29 In Appendix 2, I present a simple model of asset accumulation and tenure choice,
and calibrate it using characteristics of the 1960 housing market. For the ages I examine and the
dierences between VA and alternative terms, this calibration suggests that I should nd larger
eects at younger ages.
4 Eects of Service and Benets on Home Ownership
4.1 Data and Empirical Design
The main empirical analysis is based on IPUMS Census microdata in 1960, 1970, and 1980 (Ruggles
et al., 2008). I use the 1960 1 percent sample, an aggregation of the three 1 percent 1970 Form 2
samples, and a 3 percent sample drawn from the 1980 5 percent State sample. I use the remainder
of the 1980 5 percent State sample, in addition to four remaining 1% samples from the 1980
Census, for the break searches described below (I refer to this sample as the 1980 `break' sample, to
distinguish it from the `analysis' samples). I restrict the sample to men born in the United States
within the relevant bandwidth: for the pilot bandwidth, this includes men born from 1925 to 1936.
29Ortalo-Magn e and Rady (1999) emphasize the dierential eects of reduced down-payments by age groups in a
more general model with overlapping generations and supply constraints, with a similar nding that easier terms on
housing nance leads to a shift towards ownership at younger ages.
11Other sample restrictions are discussed in Appendix 1.
The steep declines in military service by date of birth for men coming of age at the end of
World War II and the Korean War are evident in Figure 3, which shows the share of men in the
1960 Census who reported being veterans of the World War II or Korean War periods.30 The two
steep declines in the probability of military service were associated with cohorts coming of age
for military service just as inductions fell at the end of hostilities in World War II in 1945, and
similarly in the Korean War in 1953. Throughout this discussion, I will refer to the rst break,
associated with the decline in inductions in 1945, as the \World War II break" and to the second,
corresponding to the decline in 1953, as the \Korean War break."
To estimate the eect of service and benets on home ownership or other outcomes, ideally each
break would have some marginal date of birth at which the probability of military service exhibits
a discrete shift, to which a regression discontinuity design could be applied directly. As is evident
in Figure 3, however, at the national level the decline occurred rapidly but not at a single marginal
date of birth. As I discuss in section 4.3, the absence of a national cuto was due in part to local
variation in the implementation of the draft; even if states or localities followed draft rules with
marginal dates of birth, to the extent that these marginal dates are dierent, the national series
will show more continuity of service levels by birth cohort. I lack the data to exploit this local
variation fully, but explore it as a robustness check below.31
The main estimates, in the spirit of a regression discontinuity design, address heterogeneity in
age by estimating local polynomial regressions at each break. Without a single marginal date of
birth for military service at the national level, determining a specic cuto at which to estimate a
discontinuity is a challenge in implementing this approach. I do so using structural break estimation
techniques in the `break' sample, as described below. Given the cutos estimated in the break
30As noted above, veterans' benets were not extended to veterans of other periods until 1966. I identify a veteran
as an `eligible veteran' in 1960 if he reports having served during the World War II or Korean War periods, and as
an eligible veteran in 1970 and 1980 if he reports having served during any period. Appendix Figure A3.2 shows the
share of the same cohorts that reported being veterans of any conict in the later Census years.
31This discussion has focused on variation in the share veteran by birth cohort primarily relating to the propensity
to be drafted, rather than the propensity to volunteer. There may have been some men who would have volunteered
under a `high' military manpower need regime but not under a `low' one, inducing discontinuous variation in volun-
teering rates. To the extent that this is the case, these men are included among the `compliers,' but the estimates
can still be regarded as causal.
12sample, I apply a regression discontinuity framework in the analysis sample to estimate the size
of the decline in the probability of military service at each cuto. The estimate is the dierence
between two counterfactuals: one predicting the probability of military service for an individual at
the cuto based on the cohorts immediately preceding him, and one predicting his probability of
service based on the cohorts following him. Implementing the same approach with housing or other
outcomes as the dependent variable, I then follow standard practice in fuzzy RD designs and scale
the reduced form estimate by the estimate of the discontinuity in veteran status. In practice, the
implementation uses a two-stage least squares estimator, in which I use birth before the cuto as
an instrument for veteran status.
The pilot bandwidth for the analysis is three years on either side of each break.32 In the baseline
specication, I follow Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and estimate a local linear regression within this
bandwidth in the three Census cross-sections:33
yit = t+t1(yqobit < c)+t(yqobit c)1(yqobit < c)+t(yqobit c)1(yqobit > c)+0
tXit+"it; (1)
for individual i observed in year t 2 f1960;1970;1980g, where c represents the relevant cuto,
yqobit his year and quarter of birth, 1(yqobit < c) indicates that he was born before the cuto,
1(yqobit > c) indicates birth after the cuto, and (yqobit   c) represents the time in quarters
between his date of birth and the cuto. Xit is a vector of controls, including xed eects for the
quarter of the year in which an individual was born, xed eects for state of birth, and an indicator
for nonwhites. Coarse measurement of date of birth suggests clustering standard errors by year and
quarter of birth (Lee and Card, 2008), but conventional heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
are typically of similar magnitude or larger: in the tables that follow I present the latter.34
To determine the cutos, I apply the structural break estimation techniques used in, for example,
32A cross-validation procedure following Imbens and Lemieux (2008), applied to both the rst stage and the
reduced form, suggests a bandwidth of 3 or 4 years for housing outcomes; the cross-validation criterion is relatively
at for the rst stage but suggests that a shorter bandwidth would be better. I choose the 3-year bandwidth, and
present specications with shorter bandwidths in Appendix Table A3.2.
33The t subscripts indicate that coecients are allowed to vary by Census year, and that individuals are not
necessarily followed over time.
34Another issue is accounting for estimation of the location of the break in the standard errors; but as discussed
by Card et al. (2008), if a break does exist, the estimator of its location is n-consistent, and variance estimators that
treat the location of the break as known are consistent.
13Chay et al. (2005) and Card et al. (2008). To determine a location for the World War II cuto, I use
the 1980 break sample, and limit the sample to men born between 1925 and 1930. I then estimate
separate models with candidate cutos placed between each pair of neighboring birth cohorts from
1926 to 1929, and choose the cuto that gives the highest R2 in a regression with exible linear
trends. In the search for the Korean War cuto, I restrict the sample to men born between 1931
and 1936, and consider candidate cutos between 1932 and 1935. Applied to either the probability
of being a veteran of the World War II or Korean War period, or to being a veteran of any period,
this technique places the World War II cuto between 1927q4 and 1928q1 (which I will refer to as
a cuto of January 1, 1928) and the Korean War cuto between 1933q3 and 1933q4 (which I refer
to as October 1, 1933). Comfortingly, a visual inspection of the rst stage suggests these cutos
are reasonable.
4.2 Results
Table 2 presents means of key variables for the two cohorts around each break in each Census
year, to aid in the interpretation of magnitudes of the eects estimated below. Men at the World
War II break were 32 years old at the time of the 1960 Census. Slightly more than half owned
their homes in 1960. The share rose to 73 percent in 1970, and to 80 percent in 1980. The men
around the Korean War break were 26 in the 1960 Census, and 28 percent owned their homes.
This increased to 66 percent in 1970, and to 79 percent in 1980. In the 1960 data, therefore, one
observes these cohorts as they transition rapidly into home ownership; subsequent changes between
decades reected a leveling of the age-ownership prole.
Table 3 presents estimates of equation (1), and Figure 3 shows the corresponding means by
cohort and estimated trends for both the rst stage and reduced form. First-stage estimates of the
decline in the probability of being a benets-eligible veteran in 1960 are large and highly signicant
at each break: men on the earlier side of the World War II break were 11 percentage points more
likely to be eligible than those born slightly later. The corresponding estimate of the Korean War
break is 16 percentage points.
The IV estimates in columns (3) and (6) suggest that being an eligible veteran led to large
14increases in the probability of owning one's home in 1960. For individuals coming of age at the end
of World War II, the estimated treatment eect of service and benets is 13 percentage points. The
predicted probability of home ownership for a comparable non-veteran at the break is 44 percent,
suggesting that service and benets increased the rate of ownership at the World War II break
by about 30 percent. For individuals coming of age at the end of the Korean War, the estimated
treatment eect in 1960 is larger, at 18 percentage points.35 The predicted probability of home
ownership for comparable non-veterans is 22 percent at the break, giving an 80 percent increase in
the probability of home ownership at the Korean War break.
Section 3 suggested that eects of easier terms on housing nance should decline as individuals
age and accumulate assets. One implication is that tracing the same cohorts over time, the size
of the estimated dierence in home ownership at each cuto should decline. Indeed, the results
for home ownership in 1970 and 1980 give no evidence of signicantly higher ownership in either
of the later years, at either break.36 Point estimates are negative, statistically indistinguishable
from zero, and signicantly dierent from the 1960 coecients. A natural interpretation of this
nding is that the VA program did not induce home ownership among individuals who never would
have purchased otherwise, but rather increased aggregate home ownership rates by shifting home
purchase earlier in life.
A useful aspect of this empirical setting is that there is an alternative test for heterogeneity of
eects by age, which is to compare the World War II and Korean War estimates within a single
Census year. Doing so is helpful to the extent that convergence at the cutos over time could have
been associated with improvements in terms on non-VA loans over the 1960's. Table 1 suggests
35The use of educational deferments during the Korean War somewhat complicates interpretation of the IV esti-
mates at the Korean War break, but if there is a bias, it is likely to be negative rather than positive. As emphasized
in the literature on the Vietnam-era draft (e.g., Card and Lemieux (2001)), men at risk of being drafted may have
entered college as a way to avoid military service. Given that deferments were not introduced until 1951, after the
Korean War had begun, this is likely to be more of an issue in interpreting the estimate at the Korean War break. I
cannot denitively say how much of the reduced-form dierence should be attributed to greater educational attain-
ment among non-veterans in the cohorts at higher risk of being drafted. But in my 1960 analysis sample, a simple
dierence suggests that at age 26, college completion was associated with a lower probability of home ownership,
by about 4.5 percentage points. If higher risk of being drafted increased rates of college completion, and if the true
eect of college completion on home ownership at age 26 is negative, it suggests that my estimate at the Korean War
break is biased downward.
36The magnitude of the rst stage declines at the Korean War break between 1960 and 1970; this is due to a
change in the denition of `benets-eligible' veteran from being a veteran of the World War II or Korean War period
to being a veteran of any period, as described in Section 2.
15that VA loans were still available on easier terms than FHA loans in 1970, but at a level dierent
from earlier years, which could have driven convergence even in the absence of heterogeneity by
age. But comparing the results for 1960 in columns (3) and (6) of Table 3, estimates of the veteran
eect for the younger men at the Korean War break are larger in both percent and percentage
point terms. The estimated dierences between the breaks within Census years are not statistically
signicant, but the general pattern of eects is consistent with the prediction that the eects of the
VA program should decline with age.37 Moreover, the estimates at the two ages in 1960 can be used
to assess whether or not the fade-out by age 36, as suggested by the 1970 results, is reasonable. As
I discuss in Section 6, a linear extrapolation of the percent eects from 1960 suggests that I should
not observe eects of the VA program by age 36.38
4.3 Robustness
Given the absence of a national date-of-birth cuto for the draft, it is useful to show robustness
of the main results to alternative ways of exploiting the variation in military service across birth
cohorts. A rst alternative that removes some cohorts with `intermediate' levels of treatment is
to drop the birth cohort that immediately precedes each cuto and the cohort that immediately
follows it, thus extending the extrapolation to the cuto by an additional quarter. Doing so has
little eect on the World War II estimate { it increases to 13.6 percentage points (an eect of 31
percent relative to a predicted probability of ownership for comparable non-veterans of 44 percent),
and remains signicant at the 10 percent level. The Korean War estimate falls to 13 percentage
points (a 54 percent eect relative to a corresponding predicted value of 24 percent), but is of
broadly similar magnitude and still signicant at the 1 percent level. A full set of results are shown
in Appendix Table A3.4.
37Just as a comparison of estimates at the same break over time may confound an `age' eect with a `time' eect, a
comparison of estimates at the two breaks within the same cross section may confound an `age' eect with a `cohort'
eect. If the characteristics of compliers are dierent at the two breaks, for example, comparison within a single
Census year is a comparison of local average treatment eects for two dierent populations. Neither comparison is
entirely satisfactory, but by exploiting the presence of two breaks to make both comparisons, I am able to provide at
least some degree of cross-validation.
38To the extent that these estimates overstate the true speed of fade-out of the eects by age in 1960, the estimates
of the impact of veterans' benets on the aggregate rate of home ownership, presented below, are likely to be an
understatement of their true eect.
16A second alternative is to estimate a `cohort-trend' model similar to that used in much of
the previous literature on the GI Bill.39 This approach rests on the assumption that within the
range of cohorts included in the sample, the share of each cohort that served in the military was
driven by military manpower needs and not by other between-cohort dierences. In each Census
cross-section, I regress the average outcome for a birth cohort on the share of men who were
benets-eligible veterans in the cohort, controlling for an underlying trend. That is, in a single
cross-section from year t, I estimate
yct = t + tV ct + t(c) + 0
tXct + "ct (2)
where c indexes cohorts, V ct is the share of men who were benets-eligible veterans in birth cohort
c in year t, t(c) is either a linear or a quadratic cohort trend, and Xct is a vector of controls. This
model has the benet that it does not require a discrete shift in the probability of veteran status
at a single date of birth. As a main specication, however, it is less natural for examining eects
that may be heterogeneous in age, since it estimates an eect of veteran status over all the ages in
the sample, rather than one at a clear cuto. In my estimation of the model, I attempt to address
heterogeneity of treatment eects by estimating the equation in narrow windows around the two
periods of decline.40
I present estimates of the cohort-trend model of equation (2) in Table 4.41 With controls, the
cohort-trend model gives estimates of 15 percentage points at the World War II break and 19
percentage points at the Korean War break.42 The Korean War estimates are signicant at the
39Examples are Bound and Turner (2002), Page (2006), and Bedard and Desch^ enes (2006). Angrist and Krueger
(1994) use a slightly dierent form of variation that exploits within-year-of-birth dierences in call-up rates.
40Following Page (2006) and Bound and Turner (2002), I have also explored models that assume a parametric
form of heterogeneity, interacting the veteran share with a linear or quadratic trend. With home ownership as an
outcome, I found the results to be sensitive to dierent specications of the underlying trend. Un-interacted versions
within narrow windows are substantially more stable across specications.
41Estimates over a wider bandwidth and with alternative specications of the underlying trend are shown in
Appendix Table A3.3.
42Note that the World War II and Korean War veteran shares are not entered separately in equation (2). At the
World War II break, where those on the earlier side mostly served in World War II, and those on the later side mostly
served in the Korean War, this model imposes the restriction that the eects of military service and benets in the
two conicts are the same as of year t (1960 or later). Justications for doing so are that the housing benets were
very similar for the two conicts, and that by 1960 men on both sides of the World War II break would have been
back for several years. If the `true' World War II eect as of 1960 was larger than the corresponding `true' Korean
War eect, my estimate at the World War II break is likely an overestimate; conversely, if the `true' World War II
175 percent level using conventional standard errors; the World War II estimates are not. It is also
notable that there is no evidence for a positive eect of veteran status on home ownership at either
break in 1970 or 1980.43
A nal alternative is to estimate `re-centered' specications that exploit the local character of
the draft. For the decline in service rates associated with the end of hostilities in Korea, for example,
the absence of a single, discrete shift in the national series is due in part to a local component of the
draft: men were liable to be drafted from age 181
2, but there was a general policy of drafting older
men rst, and in particular to exhaust the supply of men 19 and above in the local draft board
area before drafting younger men (U.S. Selective Service System, 1953). Even if the decision rule of
each local draft board entailed a discrete shift in the probability of being drafted at some marginal
date of birth, when averaged over all draft boards the actual share veteran by cohort could exhibit
a more gradual decline.
Figure 4 depicts the rate of military service by date of birth for men born in Ohio and California,
and provides evidence both that local variation in the draft may explain the non-discrete shift in
the national series, and also that state of birth, in some cases, provides a reasonable proxy for an
individual's local draft board regime. In both states discontinuities in the probability of military
service are visually evident, but the location of the breaks diers between the two states.44 I apply
the structural break technique described above to estimate state-specic breaks in the 1980 break
sample. I then `re-center' by generating a new running variable for each individual that represents
the distance between his quarter of birth and the cuto estimated for his state of birth. To address
possible recall bias, or dierences in the surviving veteran population in 1980 relative to 1960, I also
estimate state breaks in the 1960 analysis sample (referred to below as `1960 breaks' to distinguish
them from the `1980 breaks'), but given the potential biases arising from using the same sample
eect was smaller then my estimate is probably an underestimate. With home ownership as an outcome, the results
when both are entered separately are unstable across alternative specications. Men at the Korean War break would
have been too young to serve in World War II, so this caveat does not apply there.
43In 1970 the estimate at the Korean War break with controls is, in fact, signicant and negative, although this
is not the case in the local linear estimates discussed above.
44Other states do not always exhibit discontinuities as visually evident as these, presumably because of more
heterogeneity across draft boards within the states, marginal dates of birth falling in the middle of a birth quarter,
or application of a dierent decision rule by draft boards. A full set of state graphs, with the corresponding break
points, are shown at the end of Appendix 3.
18for both the break search and analysis, I treat these results as supplementary.
Re-centered local linear specications present further evidence supporting the main estimates.
Figure 5 shows the means and estimated trends at each break in 1960, and Table 5 presents the
corresponding estimates. Downward shifts in the probability of home ownership are perhaps more
visually evident in these graphs than in the un-recentered versions, but the point estimates are
quite similar. Using the 1980 breaks gives estimates of 15 percentage points for each break in 1960,
very similar to the main specications. These correspond to 36 and 67 percent increases relative
to comparable non-veterans at the World War II and Korean War breaks, respectively. The 1960
breaks also give an estimate of 15 percentage points at the World War II break in 1960 (a 35
percent increase), and 10 percentage points at the Korean War break (a 38 percent increase). All
of the estimates of the veteran eect on home ownership in 1960 are statistically signicant at
conventional levels.
The estimated eects of service and benets on home ownership are quite stable across speci-
cations: the alternative approaches all provide evidence of large, positive eects of veteran status
on home ownership early in life, and attenuation of the eect of veteran status in later years.
Generalizing the results to mortgage subsidies that are not bundled with other benets or military
service itself, however, requires disentangling the dierent aspects of the `veteran treatment'; this
is the task of the next section.
5 Evaluating alternative explanations
The results presented above answer the question of what impact the combination of an individual's
military service and eligibility for veterans' benets had on his housing outcomes, but does not
necessarily isolate the eect of easier mortgage nancing. It is not immediately obvious whether
one should expect service or other benets to have had a positive or negative eect on the probability
of home ownership. Military service may have reduced rates of ownership on return to civilian life if
separation from the labor market lowered earnings. On the other hand, service may have increased
the probability of ownership if temporary separation from civilian life led to preferences for earlier
household formation, or lower desired mobility, after service was complete. Education benets may
19have increased ownership rates either through higher permanent income or other complementarities
with home ownership; other benets, such as job training, may have also increased earnings. To
the extent that higher education benets increased desired mobility during college attendance,45
they could have instead reduced the probability of home ownership at younger ages. In three
complementary analyses below, I assess the potential importance of these other factors.
5.1 Possible impacts of other benets
There are several reasons to think it unlikely that veterans' eligibility for education and training
benets explains the positive eects on home ownership that I nd in 1960. Past work on the
draft and educational benets on educational attainment, such as Stanley (2003), has emphasized
that the World War II GI Bill was largely compensatory in its eects, making up for the large
disruptive eects of military service on education. At the Korean War break, the ownership eects
in 1960 are likely too early to be due to Korean War veterans taking advantage of their education
benets. I nd that a similar application of the regression discontinuity design estimates a net
positive eect of service and benets on various measures of educational attainment in 1970, in
line with the ndings of Bound and Turner (2002). Yet the same type of estimate also suggests
that high school completion rates were lower for earlier cohorts at the World War II break in all
three Census years, and provides no evidence for greater educational attainment for veterans at the
Korean War break in 1960. Moreover, even to the extent that education benets under the GI Bills
more than compensated for the disruption of education during military service, the costs of service
also included forgone labor market experience, which likely depressed wages (Angrist, 1990).
In the absence of complementarities between education and ownership as a form of housing
tenure, the natural argument for a positive eect of education benets on home ownership in 1960
is through increased income. More broadly, other benets, such as on-the-job training or preferences
in hiring, may have increased income for veterans as well. As a rough summary measure of the
possible eects of education or other benets, it is therefore natural to test for discontinuities in
income across cohorts. However, the rapidly changing curvature of the income prole for these age
45Studying the Vietnam draft, Malamud and Wozniak (forthcoming) suggest that one channel through which
education may increase mobility is through attending college in a dierent state.
20groups makes an application of the RD framework somewhat more problematic.46 Nevertheless, I
test for discontinuities in the log of total personal income, conditional on positive income, using
the same approach as the main estimates in Section 4.2. I present the estimates in Table 6.47
There is little evidence based on these specications that income could be driving the results for
the World War II break: I nd a negative estimate, not signicant at conventional levels. For the
Korean War break, the estimate suggests higher income for veterans, although it is worth noting
that the estimate declines in both size and signicance when estimated using a shorter bandwidth,
as suggested by a cross-validation procedure.
To explore further whether or not the documented eects of veteran status on home ownership
could be due to increased income or other eects of educational benets, in columns (4) and (5)
of Table 6 I re-estimate the main specication adding log income and college completion as right-
hand-side variables. Controlling for these leads to a small increase in the estimate at the World
War II break and a small decrease in the estimate at the Korean War break, but the estimates
remain positive, statistically signicant, and comparable in magnitude. These results, of course,
do not imply that other benets played no role in higher home ownership rates for veterans, but
they do suggest that other benets were not the primary cause.
5.2 Estimating service eects: World War I veterans
No national program of home loan benets existed for veterans of the First World War. A similar
regression discontinuity analysis gives an estimate of the possible direct eects of service in World
War I that one may consider in evaluating the relevance of service eects to explaining the observed
dierences in home ownership at the World War II and Korean War breaks. Due to state and
national veterans' benets that did exist after World War I, the estimates I present are likely an
upper bound on possible direct eects of service. These benets included a generous national bonus
and slightly smaller bonuses in 21 states, as well as home loan benets in four states.48
46Indeed, a cross-validation procedure suggests using a shorter bandwidth for income than for home ownership.
47As is evident in Table 2, almost all men at the cuto earned positive income by 1960. I nd no evidence of a
discontinuity in the probability of positive income at either break.
48Dillingham (1952) provides a review of the national bonus, which was to be paid out in full in 1945 but which
could be used as a security for borrowing as early as 1925; the full amount of the bonus was eventually paid out in
1936. A survey of all state veterans' benets provided after World War I is given in U.S. House of Representatives
21I use IPUMS data from the 1920 and 1930 Censuses. These Censuses do not record year
or quarter of birth, only age in years. I calculate an approximate year of birth assuming each
individual's birthday fell after the day of the Census. Because the 1920 Census did not ask about
veteran status, I report only reduced form estimates for 1920, but I report both reduced form and
IV estimates for 1930.49
The upper panel of Figure 6 shows the share of each birth cohort reporting service in World
War I in the 1930 Census. Applying the same break search procedure as in the main analysis, I
locate a break between 1896 and 1897.50 A cross-validation procedure applied to both the rst
stage and reduced form suggests a bandwidth of 5 years; the results below are not sensitive to the
choice of bandwidth.
The results in Table 7 and the lower panel of Figure 6 oer no evidence that service in World
War I led to earlier home purchase. Although the rst stage is large and signicant, reduced form
coecients in both 1920 and 1930 are very close to zero and fairly precise, as is the scaled estimate
for 1930. Moreover, to the extent that the benets that were extended to World War I veterans
raised their rates of home ownership relative to non-veterans, it suggests that on net, the direct
eects of service were negative, not positive. The experience of World War I veterans thus weighs
against the notion that direct eects of service can explain the observed discontinuities for veterans
of World War II and the Korean War in 1960.
5.3 Further evidence on service eects: timing of purchase
The timing of use of the VA housing benet, and home purchase for veterans, provides comple-
mentary evidence that the eects of veteran status on home ownership in 1960 were not driven
by service-induced preferences for earlier household formation. While the government provided
a guarantee to lenders, obtaining a loan still required that a private lender was willing to give a
veteran a loan on VA terms. An analysis of the timing of veterans' home purchase relative to
(1945).
49As shall be seen, the reduced form results in 1920 show little that would merit a two-sample IV procedure.
50In particular, I limit the sample to men born from 1891 to 1902, place candidate cutos between each pair of
neighboring years of birth from 1892 to 1900, and estimate a piecewise linear model allowing exible trends on either
side of each candidate cuto. The break between 1896 and 1897 yields the model with the highest R
2.
22non-veterans suggests that in periods when VA loans became more appealing to suppliers of funds,
and available at lower down-payments, veterans were dierentially more likely to purchase homes.
In the decade following World War II, the number and volume of VA loans exhibited large swings
from year to year. The year-to-year volatility in VA lending is evident in the upper panel of Figure
7, in which the bold line shows the number of VA loans closed, by quarter, from 1946 through 1956.
While the number peaked soon after World War II and again after the Korean War, the latter
peak appears not to be due solely to the return of Korean War veterans. I use annual gures on
the share of loans made under the World War II entitlement (U.S. Veterans Administration, 1962)
to estimate the number of loans to World War II veterans from 1952 onwards. The large share
of World War II veterans in the 1955 peak suggests that it was not driven solely by the return of
veterans from the Korean War.
Given the presence of three large spikes in use of the benet among World War II veterans, a
natural question is what drove these uctuations, if not veteran demand shocks. An explanation
given by many contemporary observers, such as Klaman (1961) and the Veterans Administration
itself (e.g., U.S. Veterans Administration (1948)), was that they were driven in large part by
lenders' willingness to supply loans on VA terms. In particular, the interest rate ceiling on VA
loans discussed in Section 2 meant that as yields on alternative investments increased, the market
could adjust only by reducing the supply of funds for VA mortgages and changing other terms
of the loans, such as down-payments.51 Conventional loans, on the other hand, had no interest
rate ceiling, while FHA loans had an interest rate ceiling that was higher than that on VA loans
and tended to be less binding.52 As a result, non-VA loans did not exhibit the same degree of
year-to-year volatility over this period that VA loans did.53 The lower panel of Figure 7 shows the
dierence between the maximum interest rate for VA loans and the annualized yield on lowest-risk
corporate bonds. It is unmistakable that over this period rises and declines in the number of VA
51Grebler (1960) noted that trading VA mortgages at prices below par was seen as having an \aura of `unethical'
practice," and hence that mortgage discounts failed to adjust the yield on VA mortgages.
52In the 1950 Residential Finance Survey, over 99 percent of the stock of VA mortgages had an interest rate of
4%, precisely at the cap, while roughly 25 percent of the stock of FHA mortgages had interest rates below the FHA
cap of 4.5% that was in place prior to 1950. In 1950, this cap was lowered to 4.25%.
53Conventional loans did exhibit more pronounced seasonality than VA loans did, probably for reasons having to
do with the institutional structure of the market: see Klaman (1961), page 123.
23loans track similar changes in the dierence between VA rates and the yield on corporate bonds,
while any similar trend for non-VA loans appears much more muted.
Rationing VA loans through higher down-payments may have been one way that markets ad-
justed.54 The top panel of Figure 8 shows the dierence between the average LTV for VA loans
and that for FHA loans originated in each year for existing homes, and the bottom panel shows the
annual mean of the dierence between the VA cap and the yield on corporate bonds. In years when
VA loans would have been more (less) appealing to suppliers of funds, the dierence in average
loan-to-value ratios between VA and FHA loans was greater (smaller).
To the extent that the increases in the number of VA loans reect the supply of funds rather
than demand shocks, it is informative to ask whether periods when VA loans were available on easier
terms, relative to the alternatives, saw dierentially greater rates of home purchase by veterans.
The early years of the Survey of Consumer Finances, which was carried out annually beginning in
1947, provide a rare source of data to do so. The SCF did not ask about entry into home ownership
consistently over time, but did ask reasonably consistently about purchase of a home the previous
year, and collected data on whether the head of each `spending unit' was a veteran up through the
1957 survey.55 To focus on the age group most likely to be entering home ownership, in each year
I limit the sample to spending units whose heads were between 25 and 34 years old.56
From the middle panel of Figure 8, it appears that in years when veterans had dierentially
greater increases in access to credit, they also purchased homes at dierentially higher rates. Spend-
ing units with World War II veterans were more likely to purchase than those without veterans in
each year.57 But the dierence was greater in years when the top and bottom panels would sug-
54Potentially amplifying this tendency were explicit minimum downpayment requirements for VA loans from late
1950 until April 1953 and from July 1955 to April 1958. These requirements were around 4 percent in the earlier
period (lower for less expensive and higher for more expensive houses) and 2 percent in the later period. Minimum
downpayments were raised for FHA loans in both periods as well. Grebler (1960), Klaman (1961), and Herzog and
Earley (1970) provide details.
55The spending unit is the basic unit of observation in the SCF. It is dened as a group of related individuals
living in the same dwelling who pool their incomes for major items of expense. A married couple is always grouped
together, and an individual who does not earn an income over a certain threshold cannot form a separate spending
unit. Between 1947 and 1957, there were about 3,000 spending units interviewed in each year.
56Unfortunately age is measured quite coarsely in the SCF, making it impossible to control for age more nely.
Hence, in any year the average age of veterans is likely to be dierent from non-veterans. From patterns of military
service by birth cohort, one can infer that for this age group, non-veterans would tend to be older than veterans up
until the last two or three years.
57In this gure I exclude spending units with Korean War veterans, to de-emphasize any eects driven by purchase
24gest that VA loans would be easier to obtain, or available with dierentially lower down-payments.
Table 8 presents a quantitative estimate of this result: column (1) implies that an increase of 0.1
in the dierence between the VA rate and the corporate bond yield is associated with an increase
in the rate of house purchase that is greater by 0.008 for veterans, a little more than 10 percent of
the average share of spending units buying a house each year.
It is possible that these patterns simply reect a situation in which military service induces
preferences for earlier home purchase, and in which veterans do not face liquidity constraints but
rather simply delay or accelerate their purchase to occur when VA loans are more available. But
these results seem more supportive of the hypothesis that eligibility for housing benets led to earlier
purchase by relaxing borrowing constraints, and less supportive of the hypothesis that military
service itself drives the results shown in Section 4.2.
6 Discussion: Aggregate eects
What role did veterans' housing benets, and changes in mortgage terms more generally, play
in the mid-century increase in home ownership? I address these broader questions by using the
estimates provided above to predict the counterfactual home ownership rate at each age in 1960 in
the absence of veterans' service and benets. Since, as I have argued, the positive eects of veteran
status on home ownership seem to be driven primarily by housing benets, in this section I will
refer to them more simply as the eects of housing benets. In addition to assuming homogeneity
of treatment eects at a given age, the calculations in this section also assume that the estimates
of the eect of changing an individual's eligibility can be applied to the thought experiment of
changing the eligibility of a large portion of the population. I attempt to shed some empirical light
on the magnitude and direction of possible general equilibrium eects below, and nd suggestive
evidence that extrapolating from the partial equilibrium estimates could understate the eect of
the VA program.
immediately after a veteran's return from war. Including them leads to no obvious dierence in the graph.
256.1 How much of the time series can the VA explain?
As a rst step, I focus on the specic ages to which the estimates apply directly. The main estimate
of the eect of veteran status at the World War II break, in Table 3, is 13 percentage points. In
1960, 69 percent of 32-year-old men were benets-eligible veterans. These gures imply that home
ownership would have been about 9 percentage points lower in the absence of housing benets,
about 26 percent of the 1940-60 change for 32-year old men (from 19 to 53 percent). Of 26-year-old
men in 1960, 44 percent were eligible veterans; the main estimate of the eect of veteran status for
these men is 18 percentage points. The same calculation suggests that the home ownership rate
for 26-year-old men would have been about 8 percentage points lower in the absence of housing
benets, about 40 percent of the increase from 1940 to 1960 (from 9 to 29 percent).
To estimate how much lower the overall rate of home ownership would have been in the absence
of veterans' housing benets, I must extrapolate from the eects I estimate directly to the eects
at other ages. Given only two points, I assume a linear decline in the percent eect with age.
Doing so yields the counterfactual age-home ownership prole illustrated in Figure 9, in which I
also show a counterfactual prole under the case in which all men were treated. The assumption
of linearly declining eects in percent terms implies a zero eect of the VA at ages 36 and above,
so both proles are the same as the actual one for ages 36 and above (consistent with the nding
of no discontinuity in home ownership at the Korean War cuto in 1970 and later, when these
individuals were 36 and older). As might be expected from age requirements for service during the
Korean War period, no men 22 or below are recorded as being benets-eligible veterans in 1960.
Hence, the counterfactual prole with none eligible for benets is the same as the actual prole for
ages 22 and below. Note that the two counterfactual age proles provide some indication of how
much earlier veterans entered home ownership because they were veterans. The prole in which no
one is eligible crosses the 50 percent mark at about age 34; the prole in which all are eligible does
so at about age 29. A comparison suggests that VA benets, had they been extended to all, would
have lowered the age at which the median individual was a home owner by about ve years.
The results imply that VA home loan benets can explain a substantial share of the aggregate
trend in home ownership from 1940 to 1960. Using the observed share veteran and home ownership
26rates in 1960, along with the extrapolated eects on home ownership, I calculate the increase in
aggregate ownership due to the VA as
P35
g=23 wg60^ gPr(vet)g60, where g indexes ages, wg60 gives
the share of men 18 and above that were of age g in 1960, and ^ g is the estimated percentage point
eect for men of age g. This calculation suggests that the rate of home ownership for men 18 and
above would have been about 1.9 percentage points lower in 1960 in the absence of the VA program.
This amount is about 7.4 percent of the overall 1940 to 1960 increase from 27 to 53 percent. A
similar calculation shows that the VA can explain about 25 percent of the 1940-60 increase for the
`aected' ages (from 13 to 41 percent).
A point estimate of a 1.9 percentage point dierence in the 1960 home ownership rate appears
reasonable in the context of veterans' survey responses in the 1977 National Survey of Veterans
(discussed in Section 2.2). The results of the 1977 Survey suggest that there were approximately
3.23 million veterans in 1977 who had used a VA loan for their rst home but would not have
had a sucient downpayment for it without their VA eligibility. A plausible interpretation of this
gure is that roughly this many individuals would have delayed home ownership if they had been
ineligible for the VA program. This number is not directly comparable to my estimates, which
instead represent how many veterans were home owners in 1960 but would not have been without
the VA benet. However, the 1979 Survey of Veterans (SOV-II), while not asking about whether
veterans could have purchased without a VA loan, did ask about the year of rst home purchase.
I calculate the share of veterans from the 1979 survey who used a VA loan for their rst home and
rst bought between 1955 and 1960, and, given the ve-year dierence in age at rst ownership
described above, assume that roughly this fraction of the 3.23 million veterans would not have
been home owners in 1960 in the absence of VA eligibility. This calculation suggests that the
home ownership rate would have been about 1.6 percentage points lower in the absence of the VA,
reasonably close to my point estimate of 1.9 percentage points.58 Using instead the share rst
58The details of the calculation are as follows. About 3.233 million veterans of World War II and/or the Korean
War, but not of later conicts, reported in 1977 that they would have had an insucient down-payment for their
rst home without the VA loan. Data from the 1979 Survey of Veterans suggests that about 26 percent of that
group rst purchased a home between 1955 and 1960. For comparison with the counterfactual estimate from my
main analysis, I then multiply by the share of World War II and Korean War veterans in 1960 who were US-born
(0.972), since my calculations from the Census use only native-born men. The resulting estimate of the number of
men who were owners in 1960 but who would not have been if they were ineligible for the VA program is 817,043, or
about 1.6 percent of the number of native-born men of age 18 and above in 1960 (51,125,748, from the 1960 Census
27buying between 1956 and 1960, the estimate would instead be 1.2 percentage points; using the
share buying between 1954 and 1960 it would be 2.0 percentage points.
Vigdor (2006) also provides an estimate of the impact of the VA program on home ownership,
calculating that about 20 percent of the increase from 1940 to 1970 was due to veterans' home loan
benets. This result is based on a direct comparison of veterans to non-veterans that controls for
a variety of characteristics, including age. My estimates suggest smaller eects, with the dierence
likely due to characteristics of selection into military service during World War II and Korea. As
emphasized in the literature on the education benets of the GI Bill (Bound and Turner, 2002;
Page, 2006; Stanley, 2003), non-veterans who were of the right age to have served in World War II
were likely strongly negatively selected, and thus less likely to own in 1970 for other reasons.
6.2 Are the estimates driven by crowd-out of non-veterans?
To the extent that the VA mortgage program aected house prices or the demand for home owner-
ship among non-veterans, these estimates may over- or understate the aggregate eect of the VA.
It is natural to suppose that the relaxation of liquidity constraints increased prices for all prospec-
tive buyers, as suggested by Shiller (2005) and Vigdor (2006), and hence that the estimates above
could partly reect crowd-out of non-veteran owners as well as net additions to the stock of home
owners. On the other hand, it is also easy to imagine that general equilibrium eects may have
been positive on net. It was noted above that federal lending programs may have led to a more
general relaxation of mortgage terms; they may have also have had positive spillovers in the housing
market by encouraging the construction of large-scale housing developments.59 Here I attempt to
shed some empirical light on the probable direction of these eects, focusing primarily on whether
the estimates are likely to be overstated as a result of crowd-out of non-veterans.
If the VA benet did not add to the stock of owners, but rather shifted ownership from non-
veterans to veterans, then all else equal, we should observe that in housing markets with a greater
of population).
59Saulnier et al. (1958), for example, argued that federal insurance programs such as the FHA and VA encouraged
these projects, and that \[l]arge projects...have made possible the application of methods of production organization
that have doubtless lowered costs in the building industry."
28presence of veterans, non-veterans were less likely to own their homes.60 A regression discontinuity
framework, as used above, is of little use here. The approach I take instead is to compare non-
veterans' probability of home ownership in states with a greater or lesser presence of World War II
and Korean War veterans in the market, both in a 1960 cross-section and in a panel specication
using the 1940 and 1960 IPUMS samples.61
To take into account confounding factors that could be correlated both with the propensity to
own and the state's share veteran in 1960, I rely on work by Acemoglu, Autor and Lyle (2004),
which argues that the variation in state mobilization rates for World War II can be understood
as a combination of `economic' factors (share farmers, average education, and share non-white),
`non-economic' factors (the age structure of the population and the share German-born), and other
variation that cannot be explained by existing data, such as idiosyncratic behavior of local draft
boards. In the regressions I present below I attempt to isolate the last source of variation by
controlling for this set of state characteristics, as well as the urban share of the population in 1940.
Even if the state veteran shares are orthogonal to omitted determinants of home ownership in
1960 once these state characteristics are held constant, there is an additional complication that in
states with more veterans, the characteristics of the marginal (and hence the average) non-veteran
may be dierent. To alleviate this concern, I include specications that restrict the sample to men
who were born too late to serve in WWII, and compare their propensity to own across states with
more or fewer WWII veterans, while controlling for the state's Korean War veteran share.
Column (1) of Table 9 presents a comparison of non-veterans across states in a 1960 cross-
section that controls only for individual-level characteristics. Column (3) presents analogous panel
specications, with xed eects for year and state of residence, that use IPUMS samples from
1940 and 1960 and dene all men as `non-veterans' in 1940. The coecient on the variable of
interest { the share of men 18 and above in the state who were eligible for benets in 1960 {
is not signicantly dierent from zero in either specication.62 Columns (2) and (4) control for
60It could also be that a greater presence of veterans in a housing market changed veterans' propensity to own,
but since this is not a necessary implication of the crowd-out story, I do not examine it here.
61A state is admittedly somewhat coarse as a representation of a housing market, but no ner level of geographical
information is currently available in the 1960 IPUMS.
62The share of all men 18 and above who were World War II or Korean War veterans may not be the relevant
measure of benets-eligible veterans in the housing market. But dening the veteran presence instead as, for example,
291940 state characteristics and Census division xed eects, interacted with time dummies in the
panel specication. Inclusion of these characteristics appears to alleviate a downward bias in
the coecient on the state veteran share.63 The cross-section specication in column (2) gives a
coecient estimate of 0.791, suggesting that for non-veterans aged 23-35 in 1960, those living in a
state with a veteran share greater by 5 percentage points were about 4 percentage points more likely
to own their homes in 1960. The panel specication in column (4) gives a very similar coecient
estimate of 0.794. The cross-section and panel estimates are signicantly dierent from zero at the
10 and 5 percent levels, respectively.
As discussed above, even if the specications in Panel A adequately control for all relevant
characteristics correlated with the state's veteran share, it may be that the observed dierences are
driven by the link between a state's veteran share and the characteristics of the marginal veteran.
For men too young to have served in World War II, however, once we control for the Korean War
veteran share, in principle the World War II veteran share should have no relationship with the
characteristics of the marginal veteran. In Panel B, I present similar specications that limit the
sample to men aged 23-29 in 1960. The coecient of interest is the share of men who were World
War II veterans. The coecient estimates in the cross-section and panel specications are similar,
at 0.874 and 0.750, respectively, both signicant at the 5 percent level. In states with a greater
presence of eligible veterans, non-veterans appear to have been more likely to own in 1960.
The nding of a positive relationship between the share veteran in a market and the probability
of home ownership for non-veterans is in line with the ndings of Vigdor (2006). While emphasizing
that veterans' benets may have increased prices relative to rents, Vigdor also nds that controlling
for an individual's veteran status, the probability of home ownership in a 1970 cross-section is higher
in metropolitan areas with more veterans { although the dierence is smaller (but still positive)
for individuals of low SES.
Isolating fully transparent variation in states' veteran shares in 1960 is beyond the scope of
the share of men aged 18 to 45 (or 18 to 35, 18 to 55, or 18 to 65) gives qualitatively similar estimates.
63This appears to be driven largely by the variables correlated with agricultural activity in 1940: the share of men
who were farmers and the urban share of the population. Due to agricultural exemptions in the World War II draft,
rural states tended to have lower mobilization rates; at the same time, they had both high levels of home ownership
and large increases between 1940 and 1960.
30this paper, so the conclusions we may draw from these results are necessarily more speculative
than for the RD estimates presented above. The nding of a signicant, positive relationship
between veteran shares and non-veterans' probability of home ownership, however, weighs against
an interpretation of the RD results as reecting crowd-out of non-veterans rather than net additions
to the set of home owners.
6.3 How much of the time series can broader changes in mortgage terms ex-
plain?
As discussed in Section 2, housing benets extended to veterans were merely one factor in a far
broader change in mortgage terms in the mid-20th century. The estimate of the overall impact
of the VA is surely a lower bound for the broader eects of nance, but it is not straightforward
to extrapolate from the estimates to the eects of these broader changes. However, I can use the
estimates of the eect of the VA to validate an alternative approach.
The 1960 Survey of Consumer Finances, the structure of which was similar to the earlier years
discussed above, asked respondents about home ownership, the dollar value of their home and of
their equity in the home, the dollar amount of their liquid assets, and the value of their other assets;
further details are provided in the data appendix. With `representative' loan-to-value ratios in the
50 to 60 percent range in the 1920's (as in Table 1), a rough pass at this broader question is to ask
what share of the population were home owners in 1960 but would have lacked the assets to make
a 40 to 50 percent down-payment on their home. The results suggest if all had needed to make
a 40 percent downpayment on their house, the home ownership rate would have been about 7.77
percentage points lower (with a 95 percent condence interval of 6.81 to 8.74 percentage points).
If all had needed to make a 50 percent downpayment, home ownership would have been lower by
11 percentage points (with a 95 percent condence interval of 9.91 to 12.16 percentage points).
By way of comparison, 11 percentage points is a little over 40 percent of the overall increase from
1940 to 1960 and about 46 percent of the increase from 1920 to 1960 (which may be the more
relevant comparison, given that the low home ownership rate of 1940 was partly associated with
the aftermath of the Great Depression).
31Such a calculation ignores many complicating factors, of course, but applying this method to
estimate how much lower home ownership would have been in the absence of the VA provides some
measure of reassurance. In particular, it suggests that requiring everyone to be able to make a 10
percent downpayment on their own home { roughly the average for FHA loans originated in 1960
and a reasonable no-VA counterfactual { would have lowered the overall home ownership rate by
1.7 percentage points (with a 95 percent condence interval of about 1.2 to 2.2 percentage points),
reassuringly close to the estimate above of 1.9 percentage points.
7 Conclusion
What role did government interventions in mortgage markets play in the mid-century increase in
home ownership? The change in the age prole of home ownership from 1940 to 1960 suggests that
much of the increase was associated with a decrease in the age at entry into ownership, for which
one natural explanation would be a trend towards easier terms in mortgage borrowing. Yet the
many concurrent changes in housing markets over this period make it dicult to isolate the eect
of government mortgage market interventions.
To shed light on this question, this paper uses steep declines in the probability of military service
by birth cohort, for men coming of age at the end of hostilities in World War II and the Korean War,
to estimate the eect of veterans' home loan benets on the probability of home ownership from
1960 to 1980. Men more likely to have served by merit of their date of birth had signicantly higher
rates of home ownership in 1960, with larger eects at younger ages. At the same time, the positive
eect diminished as the aected cohorts aged. These ndings are consistent with the prediction
that relaxing borrowing constraints should have the largest eects on younger individuals. Other
veterans' benets and service itself appear not to explain the observed dierences, leaving veterans'
housing benets as the most likely explanation for the eect of veteran status.
The estimates suggest that in the absence of the VA, the rate of home ownership would have
been about 1.9 percentage points lower in 1960. This suggests that VA housing benets may explain
about 7.4 percent of the overall change in home ownership for men 18 and above from 1940 to 1960,
and 25 percent of the change for the aected cohorts. These estimates serve as a lower bound for
32the impact of broader changes in mortgage terms over this period: a rough calculation suggests
that these changes may explain 40 percent of the overall change from 1940 to 1960.
The results underscore the idea that programs subsidizing borrowing, to the extent that they
raise home ownership rates, are likely to do so primarily by shifting purchase earlier rather than
by leading to home ownership for individuals who would never have purchased otherwise. In this
respect these results are in line with arguments in more recent periods that FHA nancing primarily
serves to accelerate ownership (Goodman and Nichols, 1997).
This paper presents evidence that changes in mortgage markets played a critical role in the
observed increase in home ownership in the mid-20th century. But it is noteworthy that much
of the 1940 to 1960 increase occurred before the end of World War II, when construction of new
housing was severely curtailed. The dramatic rate of increase in home ownership from 1940 to 1945
suggests that further research into changes in housing markets during World War II is necessary to
understand the mid-20th century increase in home ownership more fully.
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1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
year
Decennial Census Census surveys: ’44, ’45, ’47, ’56
Notes: Figure shows share of occupied dwelling units that are owner-occupied. See text for sources.
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Age
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1940 1960 1970 1980
Notes: Figure shows share of men of each age from 18 to 80 who are home owners in each Census year. Lower lines






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Share World War II / Korean War veteran, 1980 Census
Notes: Circles show share of each quarter-of-birth cohort in each state reporting being a veteran with service during
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1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901
year of birth
Share owning home, 1930 Census
Notes: Upper panel shows share of men of each `year of birth' reporting being a veteran of World War I in the 1930
Census, lower panel shows share of men owning homes. Year of birth is calculated as (1929-reported age). Vertical
line indicates estimated location of `break,' as described in Section 5.
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1946q1 1947q1 1948q1 1949q1 1950q1 1951q1 1952q1 1953q1 1954q1 1955q1 1956q1
Notes: Figure shows number of VA and non-VA loans closed each quarter, the estimated number closed under the
World War II entitlement for 1952 onwards, and the dierence between the maximum VA interest rate and yields on
AAA-rated corporate bonds. Data on number of VA loans from Housing and Home Finance Agency (1961), share
under WWII entitlement from U.S. Veterans Administration (1962). Corporate bond yields are from NBER series
m13035, at http://www.nber.org/databases/macrohistory/contents/chapter13.html.
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1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956
VA rate − yield on corporate bonds
Notes: Top panel shows dierence in average loan-to-value ratios between VA and FHA loans in each year, using data
from Herzog and Earley (1970). Middle panel shows share of spending units reporting having purchased house in the
specied year. Korean War veterans omitted; bold line shows dierence in rate between spending units with World
War II veterans and those with no veteran. Bottom panel shows annual average dierence between VA interest rate
and corporate bond yields, as discussed in text and Figure 7.


















20 25 30 35 40 45 50
actual none VA−eligible all VA−eligible
Notes: Figure shows actual 1960 age-home ownership prole, as calculated above. Counterfactual lines show predicted
home ownership if none or all men were eligible for VA benets.
45Table 1: Loan terms on one-unit owner-occupied properties
1920 1950 1960 1970
Median LTV (percent) 50 to 60 75 79 84
VA 91 91 95
FHA 79 83 93
Conventional 66 68 77
Percent with LTV 100 12 9 14
VA 32 20 34
FHA 1 3 12
Conventional 9 6 10
Median loan term (years) 5 to 11 13 20 25
VA 20 25 29
FHA 20 24 29
Conventional 11 15 21
Median interest rate 6 to 7 5.0 5.1 6.0
VA 4.0 4.5 5.4
FHA 4.5 4.6 5.8
Conventional 5.0 5.6 6.0
Notes: Data for 1920 are `typical' loan terms, from Aaron (1972). Data for 1950-1970 are from the US Census,
Residential Finance Survey, and represent the stock of rst mortgages. Loan-to-value (LTV) is dened as the amount
of the rst mortgage loan as a percent of purchase price, for properties acquired by purchase with rst mortgage
made or assumed at time of purchase.
Table 2: Means of key variables for cohorts immediately around each cuto
WWII break Korean War break
1960 1970 1980 1960 1970 1980
Veteran of WWII/ Korean War period 0.660 0.686 0.677 0.393 0.431 0.421
Veteran of any period 0.694 0.726 0.699 0.574 0.620 0.617
Currently in military 0.032 0.014 0.002 0.056 0.038 0.007
Owns home 0.527 0.726 0.804 0.279 0.662 0.789
Positive income 0.978 0.984 0.978 0.971 0.984 0.977
N 21464 59085 58482 18552 53181 54307
Notes: Table reports mean of each outcome for men in the sample born in 1927 or 1928 (near the World War II
break) and for those born in 1933 or 1934 (near the Korean War break). For sample restrictions, see Appendix 1.
46Table 3: Local linear estimates of eect of veteran status on home ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
World War II Korean War
rst stage reduced form IV rst stage reduced form IV
1960 0.107 0.014 0.129 0.159 0.028 0.177
(0.008)*** (0.008)* (0.075)* (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.049)***
N 63882 63882 63882 56901 56901 56901
1970 0.107 -0.002 -0.022 0.065 -0.004 -0.064
(0.004)*** (0.004) (0.041) (0.005)*** (0.005) (0.075)
N 175263 175263 175263 162057 162057 162057
1980 0.119 -0.005 -0.044 0.072 -0.003 -0.039
(0.004)*** (0.004) (0.033) (0.005)*** (0.004) (0.058)
N 174867 174867 174867 165032 165032 165032
Notes: Table reports estimated discontinuities at the cutos in probability of being an eligible veteran (columns 1
and 4), home ownership (columns 2 and 5), and scaled estimates of the impact of veteran status on home ownership
(columns 3 and 6). `Eligible veteran' is dened as being a veteran of the WWII or Korean War period in 1960, and
being a veteran of any period in 1970 and 1980. Bandwidth for all specications is 12 quarters. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors are in parentheses. All specications include xed eects for season (quarter) of birth, race
(white/non-white), and state of birth. ***: p < :01, **: p < :05, *: p < :1.
Table 4: Cohort-trend estimates of the eect of veteran status on home ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
World War II break Korean War break
1926-29 1926-29 1932-35 1932-35
1960 0.063 0.145 0.157 0.191
(0.086) (0.132) (0.068)** (0.081)**
[0.090] [0.195] [0.065]** [0.122]
1970 0.002 -0.036 -0.006 -0.105
(0.064) (0.075) (0.09) (0.042)**
[0.066] [0.098] [0.085] [0.057]
1980 -0.070 -0.102 -0.004 -0.030
(0.063) (0.094) (0.064) (0.066)
[0.086] [0.126] [0.094] [0.107]
Controls No Yes No Yes
N 16 16 16 16
Notes: Table reports coecients on benets-eligible veteran share in a quarter-of-birth-cohort level OLS regression
of home ownership on the veteran share and a linear trend in quarter of birth, by Census year. Additional controls in
columns (2), (4), and (6) are season (quarter) of birth indicators, share nonwhite, and real GNP in the cohort's quarter
of birth (from Gordon, ed (1986)). Sample includes men born in the US within the specied years. Conventional
standard errors are in parentheses, HC3 standard errors in brackets. ***: p < :01, **: p < :05, *: p < :1.
47Table 5: Re-centered local linear estimates of eect of veteran status on home ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
World War II Korean War
rst stage reduced form IV rst stage reduced form IV
Panel A. State break estimates from 1980
1960 0.097 0.015 0.152 0.149 0.023 0.152
(0.007)*** (0.008)* (0.080)* (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.051)***
N 63758 63758 63758 56950 56950 56950
1970 0.094 -0.004 -0.037 0.061 -0.004 -0.059
(0.004)*** (0.004) (0.045) (0.005)*** (0.005) (0.078)
N 174459 174459 174459 161638 161638 161638
1980 0.108 -0.001 -0.009 0.072 0.000 0.006
(0.004)*** (0.004) (0.035) (0.005)*** (0.004) (0.055)
N 174687 174687 174687 165492 165492 165492
Panel B. State break estimates from 1960
1960 0.120 0.018 0.150 0.176 0.017 0.096
(0.007)*** (0.008)** (0.064)** (0.008)*** (0.008)** (0.043)**
N 63794 63794 63794 57136 57136 57136
1970 0.091 -0.001 -0.014 0.055 -0.005 -0.088
(0.004)*** (0.004) (0.047) (0.005)*** (0.005) (0.086)
N 174789 174789 174789 161271 161271 161271
1980 0.090 -0.005 -0.053 0.054 -0.000 -0.004
(0.004)*** (0.004) (0.042) (0.005)*** (0.004) (0.075)
N 174686 174686 174686 165015 165015 165015
Notes: Table reports estimated discontinuities at the cutos in probability of being an eligible veteran (columns 1
and 4), home ownership (columns 2 and 5), and scaled estimates of the impact of veteran status on home ownership
(columns 3 and 6). `Eligible veteran' is dened as being a veteran of the WWII or Korean War period in 1960, and
being a veteran of any period in 1970 and 1980. Bandwidth for all specications is 12 quarters. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors are in parentheses. All specications control for age in quarters and include xed eects for
season (quarter) of birth, race (white/non-white), and state of birth. ***: p < :01, **: p < :05, *: p < :1.
48Table 6: Estimates of veteran status on 1960 income, and on ownership conditional on income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable Income Owns home Owns home Owns home Owns home
World War II -0.153 0.129 0.117 0.145 0.147
(0.109) (0.075)* (0.076) (0.072)** (0.073)**
N 62463 63882 62463 62463 62463
Korean War 0.140 0.177 0.164 0.145 0.141
(0.080)* (0.049)*** (0.050)*** (0.049)*** (0.050)***
N 55219 56901 55219 55219 55219
Additional controls ln(inc) ln(inc), college
Sample inc>0 all inc>0 inc>0 inc>0
Notes: Columns (1) shows estimates of the impact of veteran status on the log of total personal income in 1960,
conditional on positive income, for each break. Columns (2) repeats estimates shown in Table 3 above. Columns
(3) shows estimates in sample with positive income. Columns (4) and (5) show estimates of veteran status on home
ownership controlling for log income and an indicator for college completion. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors are shown in parentheses. ***: p < :01, **: p < :05, *: p < :1.
Table 7: Results from World War I local linear estimation
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable veteran owns home owns home
reduced form IV
1920 0.001
Mean ownership: 0.037 (0.003)
N 78089
1930 0.153 -0.0002 -0.001
Mean ownership: 0.250 (0.007)*** (0.006) (0.042)
N 74732 74962 74732
Notes: Table reports estimated reduced form discontinuities at cuto in probability of being a veteran (1) and owning
home (2). IV estimates (3) scale by the estimate of the corresponding discontinuity in veteran status. Threshold is
between 1896 and 1897, and `mean ownership' is rate of home ownership for men born in 1896 or 1897, where year
of birth is calculated as (Census year-reported age-1). Bandwidth includes men born in the US between 1892 and
1901. Dierence in number of observations between column (2) and columns (1) and (3) is due to missing data on
veteran status. Specications are piecewise linear in year of birth. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in
parentheses. All specications include xed eects for race (white/non-white) and state of birth. ***: p < :01, **:
p < :05, *: p < :1.
49Table 8: Dierential eects of changes in interest rates on veterans' house purchase
(1) (2)
Dependent variable bought house bought house
last year last year
Mean over period 0.073 0.074
Vet*dierence 0.081 0.073
(0.040)** (0.038)*
Korea vets in sample No Yes
N 6510 6865
Notes: Sample includes spending units surveyed in the Survey of Consumer Finances, 1947 to 1957, whose head
was age 25-34 and which reported positive income. Dependent variable indicates that the spending unit reported
having bought a house the previous year. Vet*dierence is the interaction of an indicator for veteran in the spending
unit with the average dierence between the VA rate and corporate yield in the previous year. Both specications
also control for veteran status, year xed eects, and log(income). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in
parentheses. Estimated using SCF sampling weights. ***: p < :01, **: p < :05, *: p < :1.
50Table 9: Nonveterans' probability of home ownership and state share veteran
Cross-section: 1960 Panel: 1940 and 1960
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Nonveterans aged 23-35
Share men 18+ WWII or KW vets -0.135 0.791 0.078 0.794
(0.315) (0.463)* (0.220) (0.389)**
N 60215 60215 189158 189158
Panel B. Nonveterans aged 23-29
Share men 18+ WWII vets 0.060 0.874 -0.283 0.750
(0.365) (0.430)** (0.319) (0.365)**
Share men 18+ KW vets -0.779 -0.429 0.744 -0.733
(0.991) (1.189) (0.913) (0.921)
N 40524 40524 114194 114194
Controls
Individual age, race, state of birth Yes Yes Yes Yes
1940 State characteristics No Yes No Yes
Census divison FE / trends No Yes No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is an indicator for home ownership, as dened above. WWII / KW veteran shares are
zero for all states in 1940. Standard errors are clustered by state. Individual controls include race (white/nonwhite),
age, and xed eects for state of birth. Cross-section specications control for age in quarters, panel specications
for age in completed years. In panel specications, individual controls (except for state of birth), as well as 1940 state
characteristics and Census division eects, are interacted with time dummies. 1940 state characteristics include share
farmers, share nonwhite, average years of education, share aged 13-24, share aged 25-34, and share German-born
among men aged 13-44 in the 1940 IPUMS. 1940 state characteristics also include share of the total 1940 population
living in urban areas. Panel specications also include xed eects for state and year. Panel specications use Census
sampling weights. Sample includes residents of the 48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia. ***: p < :01,
**: p < :05, *: p < :1.
51Appendix 1: Data
Census Data
The data for all of the empirical analysis, except for Sections 5.3 and 6.3, are drawn from IPUMS
Census microdata (Ruggles et al., 2008). I use the 1% samples from 1900 to 1960, a combination of
the State, Neighborhood, and Metro 1% Form 2 samples from 1970, the 5% State sample and the
four 1% samples from 1980, and the unweighted 1% samples from 1990 and 2000. In all analyses,
the sample contains only men born in the United States who were 18 years or older at the time
of the Census. In Section 2, in cases where allocation ags are available, I drop any observation
whose age, sex, place of birth, group quarters status, or home ownership status was allocated by
the Census Bureau. In all other sections, in addition to these restrictions I also drop men whose
veteran status was allocated; in the 1960 sample I also drop men for whom total personal income
was allocated.
I categorize living arrangements into the mutually exclusive categories of owning, renting, living
with relatives, and a residual category. I classify men who were listed as the household head or the
spouse of the head in an owner-occupied dwelling as home owners. Renters include household heads,
or spouses of heads, in dwellings identied as renter-occupied; I also classify as a renter anyone listed
as a roomer, boarder, or lodger. Men `living with relatives' are those who are otherwise related
to the household head. The remainder consist mostly of men in group quarters { for example,
institutions and military quarters { and household servants.
State veteran shares in Section 6.2 are calculated from the 1960 IPUMS sample using the same
data allocation restrictions as for the main 1960 analysis sample. All controls are calculated from
IPUMS data, except the urban share of each state, which is from Census counts (Haines, 2010).
Survey of Consumer Finances
Data on the timing of veterans' house purchase in Section 5.3 are drawn from the Survey of
Consumer Finances from 1947 to 1957 (Economic Behavior Program, Survey Research Center,
University of Michigan, 1973). As discussed in the main text of the paper, the unit of observation
in the SCF is a spending unit, dened as a group of related people living in the same dwelling
who pool their incomes for major items of expense. For example, an adult son living with his
parents would be classied as a separate spending unit if he does not pool his income with that
of his parents, but otherwise would be part of the same spending unit. Spending units are further
grouped into `family units' of related individuals, with a single `primary' spending unit and other
`secondary' spending units. Housing tenure is not reported consistently for spending units living on
farms, so these are excluded from the analysis. I keep only spending units whose head was between
25 and 34 years old in the survey year, and also omit spending units missing data on veteran status.
There was some variation in questions asked each year, requiring adjustment for consistency
over time. For the 1947 sample I dene a `veteran' spending unit as one with at least one veteran;
52from 1948 to 1953 as one whose head reported being a veteran, and from 1954 onwards as one
whose head reported being a veteran of World War II (or similarly for the Korean War). I classify
a spending unit as purchasing a house in the previous year if it reported buying any real estate in
the previous year (1947), buying a house in the previous year (1948), or buying its current home
in the previous calendar year (1949 to 1957). Secondary spending units who do not report any
information on having bought a home the previous year are classied as not having purchased a
home.
Section 6 uses the entire sample from the 1960 survey. Spending units are dened similarly in
that year. I calculate the value of a spending unit's liquid assets, home equity, and other assets
as a share of its home value and calculate the share of spending units that owned a home in 1960
for which this proportion was (for example) less than 40 percent. As mentioned in the text, the
1960 survey reports dollar values for the value of the spending unit's home and for their equity in
the home, as well as the dollar value of their liquid assets. Included in my measure of their assets
is an estimate of the value of their stocks. The value of stock ownership is reported only in bins;
I use the midpoint of each bin (and $25,000 for the top code, which corresponded to a value of
$25,000 and above). The survey also contains information on the value of real estate that the unit
owns other than the home, but not information on the value of their equity in it. The values are
similarly reported in bins, for which I use the midpoints and the top code in a similar manner.
Assuming that the spending unit has 100 percent equity in its non-home real estate would lower the
estimates of reductions in home ownership slightly. The reduction in home ownership associated
with a 10 percent downpayment would be 1.55 percentage points instead of 1.68 percentage points;
the estimate for a 40 percent downpayment would be a reduction of 6.86 percentage points instead
of 7.77 percentage points; and the estimate for a 50 percent downpayment would be a reduction of
9.52 percentage points instead of 11.04 percentage points.
53Appendix 2: Tenure choice model and calibration
A simple model of asset accumulation and tenure choice, calibrated using characteristics of housing
markets in 1960, claries the predictions of the life-cycle tenure choice framework at the ages
I examine in the empirical analysis. Consider the innite-horizon optimization problem of an
individual with discount rate r, whose per-period utility U(Ct;Ht) is dened over a composite
consumption good Ct and housing Ht. All individuals begin life as renters, with no assets, but may
purchase a house at T 2 (0;1) subject to a down-payment constraint. I follow Hayashi, Ito and
Slemrod (1988) in assuming that U(Ct;Ht) = logCt +(1 )logHt. For simplicity, I impose the
condition that housing is available only in a xed quantity HR for renters, and HO for owners, and
capture the idea that `pride of ownership' may give greater utility from owning a given amount of
housing rather than renting it by supposing that for an owner, Ht = HO, where   1.
An individual has income yt each period. She may save only for home purchase, at an interest
rate , and chooses an amount of savings st in each period for which she is a renter. Normalizing
the price of the consumption good to 1, the price of a unit of rental housing is R, and the analogous
price of owner-occupied housing is P. Finally,  is a constant that converts the amount PHO into
a per-period payment PHO. As discussed in the previous section, since maturities increased at
the same time as down-payments fell, I will assume that changes in down-payments do not aect
the per-period payment.







e rt [logCt + (1   )logHR]dt +
Z 1
T
e rt [logCt + (1   )log(HO)]dt
subject to
yt = Ct + RHR + st for t < T (3)
yt = Ct + PHO for t  T (4)
Z T
0
e[T t]stdt = PHO (5)
st  0 8 t: (6)
I will consider the simple case in which income is constant at y and  = r. Under these
conditions, the savings rate is constant, and reductions in down-payments lead to earlier home
purchase. To calibrate the model, I assume that rented and owned housing are identical and deliver
a single unit of housing services, or HR = HO = 1, but that owned housing gives greater utility
than the same amount of rented housing, with  = 1:5. I set  = :8. Other parameters are meant
to correspond specically to housing market conditions in 1960. In particular, I set the annual rent
at $700 and the house price at $12,000. I assume that the interest rate  and the monthly payment
54conversion factor  are both .05. The latter condition implies that per-period housing costs are
lower for an owner than for a renter. Heterogeneity in the simulation comes from variation in
income. I draw income from a truncated lognormal distribution with mean 8 (corresponding to an
income of $3,000), standard deviation 1, and a minimum income that allows everyone to aord the
$700 annual rent. Each person then chooses the optimal time of home purchase (or, equivalently,
per-period savings).
The simulation results in Figure A2.1, shown for down-payments of 10 and 20 percent, conrm
that reductions in down-payments are likely to have especially large eects on younger individu-
als.64 The age-ownership proles themselves, tracing the share of a cohort that owns over time, are
somewhat more concave than those found in the data. However, the increases in home ownership
at each age that result from reducing the down-payment from 20 to 10 percent reect the dieren-
tially large impacts of lower down-payments on younger individuals. Importantly, there are some
individuals who never choose to own under certain down-payment regimes, and lower barriers to
ownership induce some of these individuals to become owners at some point. It is therefore possible
in principle that one would observe long-lasting eects of eligibility for lower down-payments on
home ownership. However, the main result that I will bring forward into the analysis is that at the
ages I examine, dierences in home ownership between individuals facing dierent down-payments
are likely to be larger when they are younger than when they are older.




















20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
age
delta=.2 delta=.1 difference
Notes: Figure shows home ownership rates by age calculated in the simulation described in Section 3, for down-
payments of 10% ( = :1) and 20% ( = :2). Heavy line shows dierence between home ownership in low down-
payment and high down-payment regime at each age.
64These terms correspond roughly to the median terms on the stock of VA and FHA mortgages in 1960. Since VA
loans originated in 1960 had even lower down-payments, it is even more likely that in the analysis I should observe
larger eects at younger ages.
55Appendix 3: Additional Tables and Figures













1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Year
own rent live with relatives
Living arrangements, men 18 and up
Notes: Figure shows share of men 18 and older owning, renting, and living with relatives. Residual category is















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































58Table A3.2: Sensitivity of 1960 local linear estimates to alternative bandwidths
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
World War II Korean War
rst stage reduced form IV rst stage reduced form IV
Panel A. All cohorts
12 quarters 0.107 0.014 0.129 0.159 0.028 0.177
(baseline) (0.008)*** (0.008)* (0.075)* (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.049)***
N 63882 63882 63882 56901 56901 56901
10 quarters 0.097 0.016 0.161 0.142 0.026 0.183
(0.008)*** (0.009)* (0.088)* (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.060)***
N 53154 53154 53154 47320 47320 47320
8 quarters 0.090 0.012 0.136 0.120 0.026 0.214
(0.010)*** (0.011) (0.117) (0.011)*** (0.010)** (0.087)**
N 42267 42267 42267 37957 37957 37957
6 quarters 0.080 0.008 0.098 0.088 0.029 0.333
(0.011)*** (0.012) (0.145) (0.012)*** (0.011)*** (0.134)**
N 31796 31796 31796 28310 28310 28310
Panel B. Excluding two intermediate cohorts
12 quarters 0.129 0.018 0.136 0.198 0.026 0.130
(baseline) (0.009)*** (0.009)* (0.072)* (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.045)***
N 58499 58499 58499 52402 52402 52402
10 quarters 0.118 0.023 0.198 0.183 0.019 0.104
(0.010)*** (0.011)** (0.089)** (0.011)*** (0.010)* (0.056)*
N 47771 47771 47771 42821 42821 42821
8 quarters 0.116 0.020 0.168 0.166 0.017 0.103
(0.012)*** (0.013) (0.109) (0.013)*** (0.012) (0.075)
N 36884 36884 36884 33458 33458 33458
6 quarters 0.115 0.016 0.137 0.121 0.023 0.192
(0.016)*** (0.016) (0.142) (0.017)*** (0.016) (0.135)
N 26413 26413 26413 23811 23811 23811
Notes: Table reports estimated discontinuities at the cutos in probability of being an eligible veteran (columns
1 and 4), home ownership (columns 2 and 5), and scaled estimates of the impact of veteran status on home own-
ership (columns 3 and 6). `Eligible veteran' is dened as being a veteran of the WWII or Korean War period.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. All specications include xed eects for season (quar-
ter) of birth, race (white/non-white), and state of birth. ***: p < :01, **: p < :05, *: p < :1.
59Table A3.3: Cohort-trend estimates of the eect of veteran status on home ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline: all cohorts World War II break Korean War break
1923-38 1923-38 1926-29 1926-29 1932-35 1932-35
Panel A. Linear cohort trend
1960 0.269 0.322 0.063 0.145 0.157 0.191
(0.027)*** (0.025)*** (0.086) (0.132) (0.068)** (0.081)**
[0.029]*** [0.024]*** [0.090] [0.195] [0.065]** [0.122]
1970 0.070 0.026 0.002 -0.036 -0.006 -0.105
(0.061) (0.067) (0.064) (0.075) (0.09) (0.042)**
[0.058] [0.065] [0.066] [0.098] [0.085] [0.057]
1980 0.071 0.049 -0.070 -0.102 -0.004 -0.030
(0.020)*** (0.023)** (0.063) (0.094) (0.064) (0.066)
[0.024]*** [0.028]* [0.086] [0.126] [0.094] [0.107]
Panel B. Quadratic cohort trend
1960 0.069 0.136 0.089 0.127 0.158 0.197
(0.032)** (0.032)*** (0.084) (0.143) (0.070)** (0.091)*
[0.032]** [0.033]*** [0.089] [0.269] [0.073]* [0.135]
1970 -0.011 -0.039 0.005 -0.035 -0.011 -0.112
(0.029) (0.024) (0.069) (0.081) (0.094) (0.046)**
[0.029] [0.022] [0.072] [0.133] [0.091] [0.063]
1980 0.022 -0.015 -0.102 -0.089 0.035 -0.024
(0.019) (0.020) (0.064) (0.084) (0.074) (0.075)
[0.026] [0.028] [0.081] [0.151] [0.109] [0.141]
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 64 64 16 16 16 16
Notes: Table reports coecients on benets-eligible veteran share in a quarter-of-birth-cohort level OLS regression of
home ownership on the veteran share and a linear or quadratic trend in quarter of birth, by Census year. Additional
controls in columns (2), (4), and (6) are season (quarter) of birth indicators, share nonwhite, and real GNP in the
cohort's quarter of birth (from Gordon, ed (1986)). Sample includes men born in the US within the specied years.
Conventional standard errors are in parentheses, HC3 standard errors in brackets. ***: p < :01, **: p < :05, *:
p < :1.
60Table A3.4: Local linear estimates of eect of veteran status on home ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
World War II Korean War
rst stage reduced form IV rst stage reduced form IV
Panel A. All cohorts
1960 0.107 0.014 0.129 0.159 0.028 0.177
(0.008)*** (0.008)* (0.075)* (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.049)***
N 63882 63882 63882 56901 56901 56901
1970 0.107 -0.002 -0.022 0.065 -0.004 -0.064
(0.004)*** (0.004) (0.041) (0.005)*** (0.005) (0.075)
N 175263 175263 175263 162057 162057 162057
1980 0.119 -0.005 -0.044 0.072 -0.003 -0.039
(0.004)*** (0.004) (0.033) (0.005)*** (0.004) (0.058)
N 174867 174867 174867 165032 165032 165032
Panel B. Excluding two intermediate cohorts
1960 0.129 0.018 0.136 0.198 0.026 0.130
(0.009)*** (0.009)* (0.072)* (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.045)***
N 58499 58499 58499 52402 52402 52402
1970 0.135 -0.005 -0.034 0.085 -0.005 -0.054
(0.005)*** (0.005) (0.037) (0.006)*** (0.006) (0.066)
N 160551 160551 160551 149180 149180 149180
1980 0.142 -0.009 -0.064 0.087 -0.004 -0.047
(0.005)*** (0.004)** (0.032)** (0.006)*** (0.005) (0.055)
N 160363 160363 160363 151703 151703 151703
Notes: Table reports estimated discontinuities at the cutos in probability of being an eligible veteran (columns 1
and 4), home ownership (columns 2 and 5), and scaled estimates of the impact of veteran status on home ownership
(columns 3 and 6). `Eligible veteran' is dened as being a veteran of the WWII or Korean War period in 1960, and
being a veteran of any period in 1970 and 1980. Bandwidth for all specications is 12 quarters. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors are in parentheses. All specications include xed eects for season (quarter) of birth, race
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66Appendix 4: Results for housing consumption
I have not emphasized the possible eects of subsidized borrowing on the characteristics of housing
consumed, but the estimation strategy used in the paper can be applied to a number of other related
outcomes. In Appendix Table A4.1, I present estimates from the un-recentered RD design (with
no omitted cohorts) of the eect of veteran status on various outcomes measuring size, quality, and
location of housing, as well as a rough measure of migration.
Few of the estimates are signicantly dierent from zero, but several are suggestive that veteran
status increased the quantity or quality of housing in 1960. Estimates of the eect of service on
the number of rooms in one's dwelling are small and positive (here all individuals are included in
the sample, with the number of rooms dened as zero for those living in group quarters). At the
Korean War break, veteran status is associated with a 9 percentage point higher probability of
having complete plumbing, signicant at the 5 percent level (having `complete plumbing' means
that the dwelling unit has running hot and cold water, a ush toilet, and a bathtub or shower within
the structure, as explained in Ruggles et al. (2008)). Conditional on home ownership, self-reported
house value was also positively associated with veteran status, although it is of course dicult to
interpret this relationship given the discontinuities in home ownership at the two breaks. Turning to
locational outcomes, veteran status at both breaks was positively associated with living in a suburb
in 1960 (a coecient of 0.058 at the World War II break, and 0.075 at the Korean War break).
Boustan and Shertzer (forthcoming) use a slightly dierent empirical design to estimate the eect
of World War II veteran status on the probability of living in a central city, conditional on living
in a metropolitan area; despite the dierence in empirical design and the estimated parameter, my
estimate is in line with theirs. Finally, as a measure of migration I test whether veteran status is
associated with dierences in the probability of living in one's state of birth. I nd no statistically
signicant dierences, although the point estimate at the World War II break is positive and of
meaningful magnitude.
Fort the most part, the estimates decline in magnitude in 1970 and 1980. An exception is the
estimate for house value at the World War II break in 1970, which is negative and statistically
signicant; such a relationship is not evident in 1980.
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